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Social security programs and deficit policies shift the 
burden of taxation across generations. In a social security 
program the working population is taxed with the proceeds 
being paid as benefits to the older and retired group. When 
the government runs a deficit it is choosing to borrow 
instead of taxing the current population. The debt may be 
rolled over for many years and eventually paid off by 
levying taxes on future generations. 
An important issue in macroeconomics is whether and 
how such policies affect the private sector's saving behavior 
and hence the overall rate of capital accumulation and 
economic growth. Insight into this issue was provided by 
Barro (1974) who showed how these effects depend on the 
nature of intergenerational linkages; the financial connec-
tions between generations that can arise from altruistic 
motives. He considered the possibility that members of one 
generation may care about the welfare of another genera-
tion; parents may care for their children and choose to 
leave them bequests, or children may care for their parents 
by supporting them in retirement. He showed that if these 
links are sufficiently strong then a startling conclusion 
obtains: government budget policies may have no effects 
whatsoever on investment, growth, or the intergenerational 
distribution of wealth; that is, government policies may be 
neutral. Private saving behavior changes in such a way as 
to completely offset the intended effects of such policies. In 
the case of a social security program, children may simply 
reduce their support for parents dollar for dollar with the 
level of government support; in the case of a deficit, current 
generations may simply increase their saving and pass it on 
as bequests to future generations so they can afford to pay 
the higher taxes without suffering a loss in consumption.
1 
In this paper we will try to understand the economics of 
such offsetting private behavior. I first develop a simple 
model and analyze the effects of government policies in the 
absence of intergenerational linkages. Next I introduce 
such linkages and show how neutrality of government 
policies can obtain. Then I consider the relationship be-
tween neutrality and economic efficiency and show that 
there is no necessary connection between the two. That is, 
government policies may be neutral even when the 
economy is operating inefficiently, and they may not be 
neutral even when the economy is operating efficiently. 
After discussing some qualifications and extensions of the 
analysis, I conclude that considerations involving inter-
generational linkages can serve to limit the potency of 
government policies but cannot eliminate the effects 
entirely. 
A Model Without Intergenerational Linkages 
We will begin by constructing a simple model so that we 
can carefully analyze the above issues. The most natural 
model to study is clearly an overlapping generations 
model—one in which generations come and go but the 
economy (and the government!) goes on forever. The 
1 The idea that government deficit policies may be neutral, first formulated 
by the English economist David Ricardo (1772-1823), is known as the 
Ricardian doctrine. 
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simplest such model is one in which there are equal 
numbers of only two generations alive at any date, the 
working young (y) and the retired old (<o).
2 Assume that 
they are endowed with wy and w0 units respectively of a 
single good which may be consumed or invested and that if 
k units are invested at date t then f(k) units will become 
available for consumption at date t + 1. The function/® 
represents the investment technology and is assumed to be 
strictly increasing with diminishing marginal product. 
Further, /(0) = 0; that is, returns are zero if there is no 
investment. The investment technology is represented by 
the curve labeled/(/:) in Figure 1. The marginal product of 
investment is the additional output obtained due to an 
additional unit of investment and corresponds to the slope 
of thtfik) curve. As drawn, this slope is diminishing with 
the level of investment. 
Let cy(t) and c0(t) be consumptions of the young and the 
old, respectively, at date t and let U(cy(t), c0(t+1)) be the 
utility function representing preferences over lifetime 
consumption for the young at t. Note that the above 
specification implies that we are considering a case where 
each generation is completely selfish and cares only about 
its own lifetime consumption and does not care about the 
welfare of any other generation. 
Government policies are described as follows. A social 
security tax of ys is imposed every period on each young 
and the proceeds are distributed every period equally to 
each old. In addition, the government has outstanding debt 
obligations of face value d (measured in units of the good 
and per young person) which is constant over time. It 
follows that in every period additional taxes of r(t)d/[ 1 + 
r(t)] per young person [where r(t) is the real interest rate 
from t to t + 1 ] would have to be raised in order to make 
the interest payments on the debt.
3 We assume that a 
fraction 6 of the needed taxes are levied on the young and 
the rest on the old. We denote by yy(t) and y0(t) the total 
taxes (less transfers) levied on the young and the old 
respectively, so that 
(1) yy(t) = dr(i)d/[l+r(t)] + ys 
(2) y0(t) = (1 ~d)r(f)d/[ 1 + r(t)] - ys. 
It is now possible to explain the working of the model as 
follows. Investment is undertaken at each date by firms 
which are jointly owned by the young at that date. The 
firms choose the level of investment to maximize profits 
which are then paid back next period to the (then old) 
owners. Suppose that the firms invest kit) (per young 
person) at date t which is financed by issuing bonds. In 
order to be competitive these bonds must pay the same 
Figure 1 
The Investment Technology 
and the Maximization of Firm Profits 
Profit-Maximizing 
Level of Investment 
interest rate r(t) as government debt. It follows that each 
firm's profits at t + 1, denoted n0{t+\\ are given by 
(3) ir0(t+l) =f(k(t)) - [1 + r(t)]k(t). 
As shown in Figure 1, the profit-maximizing level of 
investment is that at which the marginal product of 
investment [which is the slope of the curve labeled f(k)] 
equals [l+r(f)]. It can also be seen that the level of 
investment, as well as maximum profits, decreases as the 
interest rate goes up. This makes sense since the higher 
interest rate increases the cost to firms of financing 
investment. The profits, 7r0(t+1), are paid to the old at t+ 1, 
who are the owners of the firms. 
Consumption and saving decisions are made by the 
2 While this simplification makes it easier to understand the issues, it is not 
very useful for empirical applications because it requires that each period in the 
model be thought of as corresponding roughly to 35 years. 
3This follows because the government budget constraint in each period is 
Face Value of Debt Outstanding = Taxes + Market Value of New Debt. 
Since the face value of debt outstanding is constant at d, the market value of new 
debt at date t must be d/[\+r(t)]. 
15 young at each date t so as to maximize their utility t/(v) 
subject to the budget constraints 
(4) cy(t) + s(t) = wy-yy(t) 
(5) ^(H-l) = w0 + [1 + r(t)]s(t) - yfi+l) 
+ 7ro(t+l) 
where s(t) is saving by the young. The young use their 
saving to acquire government debt and bonds issued by 
firms. They are indifferent between the two since both bear 
the same interest rate. The old in the initial period (that is, at 
date 1) simply consume whatever they have, which is 
(6) c0( 1) = w0 + [\+ rmm - 7.(1) + 7r0( 1). 
The budget constraints (4) and (5) can be combined into 
a single wealth constraint by dividing (5) by [l+r(0] and 
adding to (4). This yields 
(7) cy(t) + c0(t+l)/[l+r(i)] 
= [wy ~ 7y(t)] 
+ K - 7/f+l) + nJit+lMl + r(f)l 
The right-hand side of this equation is the present 
discounted value of a young person's lifetime disposable 
income, or wealth. The individual chooses consumption in 
each period of life given the interest rate and wealth. The 
choice of consumptions is depicted in Figure 2 as resulting 
from utility maximization subject to the above budget 
constraint. Saving may then be found from (4). 
We will assume that a rise in the interest rate reduces 
current consumption; or equivalently, increases saving. We 
also assume that an increase in wealth increases current 
consumption but by a smaller amount than the increase in 
wealth. This is captured by letting a denote the marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth [that is, the change in 
cy(t) due to a dollar's change in wealth] and assuming that a 
is positive but less than one. It follows from this that the 
effect of an increase in wealth on saving depends on 
whether the increase in wealth is due to an increase in 
current disposable income or due to an increase in future 
disposable income. If it is entirely due to the former, saving 
must rise; whereas if it is entirely due to the latter, saving 
must fall. 
The model specification is completed by imposing the 
equilibrium condition that 
(8) s(t) = d/[l+r(t)] + k(t). 
This condition simply states that total saving by the young 
must equal the sum of government debt and the bonds that 
firms issue to finance their investment.
4 
From equation (8) and Figure 2 we can now see why the 
response of private saving behavior to government policies 
is so important. If a change in the social security program 
(which changes the relative disposable incomes between 
the young and the old) affects private saving then it will 
also affect investment and hence the interest rate and the 
consumption allocation between the young and the old. 
Similarly, if an increase in government debt is not offset by 
a corresponding increase in private saving, then again 
investment, interest rates, and consumption allocations 
would be affected. Thus the response of private saving is 
the crux of the whole matter. 
Using the budget constraints (4) and (5), the equa-
tion for firm profits (3), and the equilibrium condition 
(8), we can develop the national income identity for this 
simple model economy as follows: 
(9) eft) + c0(t) = wy + w0~ [yft) + y0(t)] - s(t) 
+ [l+r(t-l)]s(t-l) + 7r0(t) 
= wy + w0~r(t)d/[l+r(t)] 
~{k(t) + d/[\+rm 
+ [l+r(f-l)] 
X{k(t-l) + d/[l +r(f-1)]} 
+ /(*(*- D) 
-[1 +r(f-l)]*(f-l) 
= wy + w0-k(t)+f(k(t-\)). 
Therefore, we have 
(10) eft) + c0(t) + k(t) = wy + w0 +f(k(t-1)) 
which states that total consumption plus investment 
equals total output, consisting of total endowment plus 
the returns on past investment. Alternatively, we can 
interpret (10) as the equilibrium condition in the goods 
market: total demand consisting of consumption de-
mand and investment demand must equal the total 
supply of goods consisting of total endowment and 
current production. If we impose (10) and work back-
4Since firms finance all of their investment by issuing bonds, the value of 
bonds issued equals their investment. 
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Figure 2 
A Person's Lifetime Consumption Choices 
Cy(t) 
OB = wealth when young 
OA = disposable income when young 
AC = disposable income when old 
wards using (3)-(5), we can derive (8) as an implica-
tion. Thus, conditions (8) and (10) are equivalent. 
Policy Effects 
We can now describe the effects of the two types of 
government policies we are considering. 
• An Increase in Social Security 
We interpret an increase in the social security program 
to mean an increase in social security taxes ys on the 
young with a matching increase in payments to the old. 
At date 1 it is clear that the old will consume all of the 
increase in the payments they receive. From the 
national income identity (10) either the young will have 
to reduce their consumption or firms will have to reduce 
investment, or both. From the point of view of the young 
this program represents a reduction in current dispos-
able income and an increase in future disposable 
income of the same magnitude. Assuming a positive 
interest rate, wealth will fall but by less than the fall in 
current disposable income. Therefore, current consump-
tion will fall by less than the reduction in wealth and 
hence by less than the reduction in current disposable 
income; consequently saving will fall, too.
5 It follows 
from (8) that investment will fall. From Figure 1 it can 
be seen that the interest rate will have to rise in order to 
induce firms to reduce investment. There is a reduction 
in wealth for all future generations; the increase in 
current taxes is larger (in present-value terms) than the 
equal increase in future social security benefits. Of 
course, the initial old are the beneficiaries of the 
increase in the program. 
• An Increase in Government Debt 
We interpret an increase in government debt in the 
following way. Assume that at date 1 the government 
increases the level of debt from d to d' and then 
maintains it at the new higher level forever. The 
increased borrowing at the initial date makes it possible 
to reduce taxes at that date. Assume that all of the 
reduction is passed on to the old at date 1. This 
corresponds to an increase in the deficit at date 1 
financed by additional borrowing. Again it is clear that 
the initial old will consume all of the resulting increase 
in their disposable income. Therefore, from the national 
income identity (10), either investment or consumption 
by the young (or both) will have to fall. For the young at 
date 1, we can see that there is no change in current 
taxes (since the entire tax reduction is given to the old) 
but that there is an increase in future taxes. Hence 
current disposable income is the same but future 
disposable income is reduced. Consequently, their 
wealth falls, which reduces their current consumption 
and hence increases saving. The crucial question is 
whether current consumption by the young falls dollar 
for dollar with the increase in debt, or equivalently, 
whether saving rises dollar for dollar with the rise in 
debt. As can be seen from the national income identity 
(10) or the equilibrium condition for saving (8), in such 
a case there will be no effect on investment and hence 
interest rates. Since this is an important point we will 
consider it in some detail. 
Suppose that at date 1 the market value of debt 
issued by the government goes up by one dollar. If 
interest rates do not change, then the face value of 
the debt must go up by [l+r(l)] dollars. Therefore, 
future taxes on the current young will go up by 
(l-0)r(l)W'-d)/[l+r(l)], which equals (l-0)r(l) 
dollars. Hence lifetime wealth of the young is reduced 
5 Note that this conclusion follows even if the interest rate is negative. In this 
case, wealth and current consumption rise and hence saving falls. 
17 by (1—0)r(l)/[l+r(l)] dollars, and consequently cur-
rent consumption will be reduced by a(l~0)r(l)/ 
[ 1 +r(1)] dollars. It follows that the reduction in current 
consumption will be less than one dollar, or equivalent-
ly, saving will go up by less than one dollar. Therefore, 
the interest rate must rise in order to induce the young to 
increase their saving and cut their consumption by one 
dollar to match the corresponding increase in consump-
tion by the old. It follows that investment must fall.
6 
As for future generations, assuming that the interest 
rate is positive, the increase in the level of debt implies 
an increase in their taxes (in both periods of life) and 
hence a reduction in wealth and consumption possibil-
ities. It is not too difficult to argue that the interest 
rates faced by future generations must also be high-
er than before. If the interest rates remain the same, 
then it can be seen from (8) that savings must go 
up by (d'—d)/[l+r(t)]. The maximum increase in 
saving occurs when 6 is zero. In that case, future 
disposable income decreases the most, causing sav-
ing to go up. The reduction in future disposable in-
come is r(t)(d'—d)/[l+r(t)], which reduces wealth by 
r(t)(d'—d)/[l+r(t)]2 and hence reduces current con-
sumption by otr(i)(d'-d)/[l+r(i)]2. It follows that 
saving goes up by the same amount as the reduction in 
current consumption. This increase in saving, however, 
is still short of the required increase of (<d'—d)/ [ 1 + r(t)] 
because ar(t)/[ 1 + r(t)] is less than one. In terms of (8), 
even in the most favorable case, saving will fall short of 
the increase in debt. Therefore, interest rates must rise 
to induce the young to save more on the one hand while 
inducing firms to invest less so that the equilibrium 
condition (8) can be met. The higher interest rate 
reduces investment permanently and thereby reduces 
the total availability of goods in the future. 
Adding Intergenerational Linkages 
Here we will consider how the conclusions of the 
previous section are affected by the introduction of 
intergenerational linkages. These linkages may take 
several forms: parents caring for the welfare of their 
children, children caring for their parents' welfare, or 
possibly both simultaneously. In addition, such caring 
may be paternalistic or nonpaternalistic. In the former, 
one generation cares not just about another genera-
tion's welfare but also about the levels of consumption 
of various goods. For example, parents may disapprove 
of their child's preference for beer instead of milk, or a 
child may disapprove of a parent's smoking or playing 
bingo. In nonpaternalistic caring, one generation cares 
only about the welfare of another and evaluates it the 
same way as the other does. In addition, there is no 
utility attached to the act of giving in and of itself 
separate from its effects on the recipient; there is no 
glow from being generous. We will mostly be con-
cerned with nonpaternalistic caring though we will 
make some comments on what is likely to happen with 
other forms of caring. We will also restrict attention to 
the simple case where each member of a generation 
cares only about one other person in the next generation 
(descendant) or the previous one (single parent). The 
situation could get more complicated if we considered 
marriage between unrelated adults or grandparents 
caring directly about grandchildren (in addition to the 
indirect caring through their children). 
The simplest way to specify utility when a parent 
cares about a child is as follows. Let V(t) be the welfare 
of a member of generation t and let P be the discount 
factor, between zero and one. Then write 
(i i) vo) = u(cy(t),c0(t+i)) + 1) 
t= 0,1,2,.... 
Note that by repeatedly substituting for V(t+1), 
V(t+2),..., and so forth, we can rewrite (11) as 
(12) V(t)=U(cy(t\c0(t+l)) 
+ pU(cy(t+l\c0(t+2)) + .... 
The case where a child cares about the welfare of the 
parent may be specified as 
(13) V(t) = U(cy(t\c0(t+1)) + pV(t~ 1) 
t= 1,2,3,... 
(14) V(0) = U(cy(0\co(l)). 
Again it follows that by repeated substitution we can 
write the welfare of a member of generation t as 
(15) V(t)=U(cy(t\c0(t+1)) 
+ pU(cy(t-l\c0(t)) +.... 
It is, of course, possible to have both of these types of 
linkages occurring simultaneously. We will, however, 
6In macroeconomics this is known as crowding out, or the displacement of 
private investment by increased government borrowing. Rising interest rates 
are what accomplish this: higher rates induce private savers to channel their 
saving toward government bonds instead of real capital. 
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analyze them one at a time. The discount factor 
indicates that (since it is less than one) even though one 
generation may care about another's welfare, it attaches 
a smaller weight to the other's welfare than to its own. 
In this sense generations are still somewhat selfish.
7 
Parent to Child 
How do members of one generation express their 
concern for the welfare of another? In the case where 
parents care about children we assume that they may 
leave a bequest which the children can either consume 
or save. Let bit) denote the bequest received by a 
generation t person from its t— 1 parent. The budget 
constraints of such a person would have to be modified 
to reflect bequests as follows: 
(16) cy(t) + s(t) = wy + b(t)~yy(t) 
(17) c0(t+1) = w0 + [\+ r(t)]s(t) - y0(t+l) 
+ 7r0(t+l)-b(t+l). 
We assume that the generation t person takes b(t) as 
given (since it is chosen by the parent) and chooses 
b(t+1) in addition to consumption and saving. We also 
require that bequests be nonnegative; that is, a parent 
may give to but not take away from the next generation. 
It is now easy to describe the choice of bequests. A 
generation t person would find it optimal to make an 
additional dollar's worth of bequest so long as the loss in 
its own utility (due to the reduction in own second-
period consumption) is outweighed by the gain in the 
next generation's utility (due to the increase in wealth) 
discounted by p. This leads to the condition 
(18) MU2(cy(t\c0(t+1)) > PMU{(cy(t+l\c0(t+2)) 
with equality if b(t+1) > 0. 
In (18), MU2 and MUX stand for the marginal utility 
of consumption in the second and the first period of life, 
respectively.
8 The left-hand side of (18) measures the 
loss in utility to the old at t+1 due to an additional 
dollar's bequest made to the young at t+1 since this 
(potentially) reduces the old's consumption by a dollar. 
The right side of (18) is the discounted gain in utility to 
the young due to the corresponding increase in their 
consumption. From (12) we see that so long as the loss 
in utility to the old is less than the discounted gain in 
utility to the young, the old will benefit by increasing 
their bequest. On the other hand, if the loss in utility to 
the parent exceeds the discounted gain to the child, then 
the parent would not be willing to make any bequest; 
that is, the bequest will be zero. This corresponds to 
having a strict inequality in (18). However, if the 
bequest is positive, then it must be that the loss and the 
gain must offset each other exactly at the margin. This 
corresponds to having an equality in (18). When there is 
strict inequality in (18), the bequest motive is termed 
nonoperative; otherwise it is termed operative. 
We will first analyze the effects of government 
policies under the provisional assumption that bequests 
are operative in every period. Next we will consider 
what happens when bequests are never operative. 
Finally we will explore the conditions under which 
bequests might or might not be operative. 
Consider what happens when the government in-
creases the level of social security taxes and benefits by, 
say, a dollar. This raises the utility of the parent but 
lowers the marginal utility. Correspondingly, it lowers 
the child's utility but raises its marginal utility. There-
fore, from every parent's perspective, the loss in utility 
from making a bequest has been reduced and the gain in 
utility to the child has been increased. It follows that it 
would be advantageous to increase the level of the 
bequest. By how much? Exactly one dollar because that 
restores the balance between the parent's and the child's 
marginal utilities that prevailed before the increase in 
social security levels. We thus come to the startling 
conclusion that consumption levels, saving, and hence 
investment and interest rates are all completely un-
affected: the increase in social security benefits to the 
old is totally offset by a matching increase in bequests 
from the old to the young. 
What about an increase in the level of government 
debt by one dollar? (Recall that the government's addi-
tional borrowing results in a tax cut for the initial old.) 
As one can guess, the old at date 1 will pass on their tax 
reduction of one dollar to the generation 1 young. The 
young will save the entire amount earning [l+r(l)] in 
their second period. They will use a part (1 ~0)r(2)[ 1 +r( 1)] 
/ [ 1 +r (2)] to pay the higher taxes in their second period 
and pass on the rest [l+r(l)][l+0r(2)]/[l+r(2)] as 
bequests to their children. They, in turn, will use a part 
0r(2)[l+r(l)]/[l+r(2)] to pay the higher taxes on 
them in their first period and save the remaining 
7Our specifications of intergenerational linkages follow those of Carmich-
ael (1982). 
8 Marginal utility of consumption is the extra utility obtained by increasing 
consumption by one unit. The law of diminishing marginal utility states that 
marginal utility decreases as consumption levels increase. In contrast, total 
utility, measured by C/(v), always increases when consumption levels increase. 
19 [l+r(l)]/[l+r(2)] dollars earning [l+r(l)] in their 
second period (that is, at date 3). From here on the story 
just repeats. It follows that the saving by the young in 
each generation will have gone up by exactly the 
increase in the market value of government debt and 
hence that investment and therefore interest rates will 
have remained the same. Similarly, everyone's con-
sumption pattern remains the same. Private saving goes 
up dollar for dollar with reductions in government 
saving (increases in the deficit) so that economy-wide 
saving (which equals investment) is unaffected. We 
thus come to the conclusion that deficits (due to tax 
cuts) financed by borrowing have no effects on the 
economy so long as every generation is linked to the 
next one by operative bequests. 
What happens if the bequest motive is not operative? 
For simplicity, assume that it is never operative. Then 
the initial old will not pass on their extra wealth 
(whether due to an increase in social security benefits or 
due to a tax cut financed by more borrowing) to the 
young and neither will the initial young make any 
bequest to their young the period after, and so on. It is as 
if every generation behaves in a strictly selfish fashion, 
and the effects are the same as if there were no 
intergenerational linkages. If the bequest motive were 
operative for some generations but not all, then the 
effects would be somewhat less than when no linkages 
exist, but policies would still not be neutral. 
It is interesting and useful to understand when the 
bequest motive might or might not be operative. As 
condition (18) states, the bequest motive will not be 
operative if the marginal utility of consumption for the 
old exceeds the discounted marginal utility of consump-
tion for the young. In view of diminishing marginal 
utility it follows that this will happen when consump-
tion of the old is much smaller than consumption of the 
young. This is likely to be the case when the endowment 
of the old is much smaller than that of the young and 
when the investment technology is not too productive. 
This makes sense because then the old do not have 
much wealth to pass on and further, they value their low 
second-period consumption much more highly than the 
relatively larger consumption of the young. This consid-
eration suggests the following. Suppose that initially the 
bequest motive is not operative. As the size of the social 
security transfers to the old or their debt-financed tax 
cuts increase, their wealth and second-period endow-
ment increase, thereby making it more and more likely 
that the bequest motive will become operative. At that 
point any further increases in these policies will be 
neutral. 
Child to Parent 
We now consider what happens if the linkage runs from 
children to parents. We denote by g(t) the gift given by a 
generation t young to its parent. The budget constraints 
of a generation t person become 
(19) cy(t) + s(t) = wy~ g(t) ~ 7/0 
(20) c0(t+l) = w0 + [\+r(t)]s(t) 
+ g(t+l)-y0(t+l) + 7T0(t+l). 
This individual takes g(t+l) as given (since that is 
chosen by the next generation) and chooses g(t) in 
addition to consumption and saving. As is natural we 
restrict g(t) to be nonnegative; a child may give to but 
not take from its parent. Analogous to (18) the condi-
tion for gifts to be made is 
(21) MUl(cy(t\c0(t+1)) > /3MU2(cy(t— 1),c0(t)) 
with equality if g(t) > 0. 
The interpretation of this condition is also similar to 
(18). If the loss in utility to generation t (which is MU{) 
from making an additional unit of gift to the parent 
exceeds the discounted gain in utility (fiMU2) to the 
parent, then a gift would not be made. If a gift is being 
made, then at the margin the loss and the gain must 
exactly offset each other. As with the bequest motive, 
the gift motive is said to be operative if there is an 
equality of marginal utilities in (21); otherwise it is 
termed nonoperative. 
It is also easy to see the mechanism by which 
government policies might be neutralized under this 
type of linkage. Suppose that the gift motive is operative 
in every period. Then an increase in the level of social 
security payments to the old will lead to a reduction by 
the same amount of the gifts being passed on from child 
to parent—assuming that the increase in payments is 
not larger than the initial level of gifts so that the gift 
motive remains operative. Similarly, a tax cut given to 
the old and financed by additional borrowing will cause 
a matching reduction in gifts from young to old with the 
reduction being saved to make up for the difference in 
future taxes. Thus, private saving rises dollar for dollar 
with the deficit so that investment, interest rates, and 
consumption allocations remain unaffected. The same 
proviso about the bequest motive remaining operative 
applies to the gift motive as well. If the gift motive is 
never operative, then the effects are the same as if there 
were no such intergenerational linkage. If the motive is 
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operative at some dates but not all, then the effects will 
be somewhat moderated. 
It is also easy to understand when the gift motive is 
likely to be operative. As condition (21) indicates, if the 
consumption of the young is relatively small compared 
to the old, then MUX is likely to be larger than MU2 so 
that gifts will not be made. This is likely to happen when 
the young are relatively poorly endowed compared to 
the old. Debt-financed tax cuts to the old and increases 
in social security, both of which transfer wealth towards 
the old, obviously make it less likely that the gift motive 
will operate. 
Other Considerations 
So far, we have considered a model in which all the 
individuals in any generation were identical with regard 
to their lifetime endowments and utility functions. It 
would be more realistic to allow for some heterogeneity 
among members of each generation. This will lead to 
the possibility that bequests or gifts may be operative 
across some members of the old and young generations 
while for others, neither is operative. So long as there 
are some people in some generations who are not linked 
via operative bequests (gifts) to the next (previous) 
generation, government policies will not be neutral. 
However, the larger the fraction of each generation that 
is linked via operative bequests or gifts, the smaller will 
be the impact of government policies. 
Another point that should be kept in mind is that 
even if initially the bequest or the gift motive is 
operative, a sufficiently large change in government 
policy may lead to the motive becoming nonoperative 
and hence the policy change will be nonneutral. If 
initially the gift motive is operative, a sufficiently large 
increase in the social security program can make it 
nonoperative. Similarly, if the bequest motive is opera-
tive initially, a tax increase on the initial old with a 
corresponding reduction in the deficit and government 
debt may make it nonoperative. The neutrality result 
that we have demonstrated is true only for those 
changes in government policy such that the bequest (or 
the gift) motive is operative before as well as after the 
policy change. 
Neutrality and Economic Efficiency 
If government policies are neutral, then is the economy 
operating as efficiently as possible? Conversely, if the 
economy is operating efficiently will government poli-
cies be neutral? The concept of efficiency we will use is 
the following: the economy is operating efficiently if it 
is not possible to increase total consumption at some 
date without reducing total consumption at some other 
date. 
That the answer to the first question is negative can 
be seen from a more detailed analysis of the gift motive. 
Suppose that the economy is in a steady state so that 
consumption allocations, investment, interest rates, and 
gifts (assumed operative) are constant over time. Indi-
viduals will choose consumptions over the two periods 
of their life such that 
(22) MU{(cy) c0)/MU2(cyfc0) =l+r. 
This can be seen from Figure 2. The left side of (22) is 
the marginal rate of substitution between first- and 
second-period consumption (the slope of the indiffer-
ence curve) and the right side of (22) is the slope of the 
budget line. From condition (21) we then have that 
(23) 1 + r= [3<l 
so that the interest rate must be negative so long as the 
gift motive is operative. The steady-state version of the 
national income identity (10) yields 
(24) Cy"\~c0 — Wy~\~w0~\~ rk 
which indicates that the total availability of goods can 
be increased in every period by permanently reducing 
investment. Consequently, so long as the gift motive is 
operative and investment is positive, the economy is 
operating inefficiently. It is not difficult to construct 
examples that exhibit these features. 
However, if the interest rate is positive then it would 
not be possible to increase the supply of goods in every 
period. If investment at date 1 is increased then the 
supply of goods in that period must be less, whereas if 
investment is permanently decreased then the supply of 
goods in the future must be less. Thus an investment 
program will be efficient if the interest rate is positive.
9 
It does not follow, however, that if the economy is 
operating efficiently then government policies will be 
ineffective! For example, we can construct situations 
such that the interest rate satisfies 
(25) 1 < 1 + r < 1/0. 
In such a case the bequest motive cannot be opera-
9The interest rate condition takes this form because we are assuming a 
stationary economy, one with no growth. In a growing economy the correspond-
ing condition for efficiency is that the interest rate must exceed the growth rate. 
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gift motive. Therefore, policies will not be neutral and 
yet the economy is efficient since the interest rate 
is positive. This discussion also reveals that when 
the bequest motive is operative (in every period) so that 
1 +r equals 1//3, we have a situation in which the 
economy is efficient and policies are neutral. 
Some Qualifications and Extensions 
Here we will discuss some qualifications for the bequest 
or the gift motive to be operative and for government 
policies to be neutral. We have already seen that the 
bequest or the gift motive has to be operative in order 
for government policies of the type considered to be 
neutral. We have also discussed the conditions on 
endowment patterns that lead to one or the other motive 
being operative. It should also be emphasized that the 
same motive has to be operative both before and after 
the policy change for it to be neutral. This should be 
clear from the previous discussion on neutrality and 
efficiency. When the bequest motive is operative 1 +r 
equals 1 / fi (in the steady state), whereas when the gift 
motive is operative 1 +r equals It follows that the 
interest rate cannot be the same if different motives are 
operative before and after the policy change and hence 
neither can investment be the same. 
Another qualification is that there be no impedi-
ments to the smooth operation of credit markets 
(Drazen 1978). An easy way to see why this is im-
portant is to consider a model with three generations 
alive at each date (old, middle aged, and young). 
Suppose that people receive endowments only in the 
middle period. Young individuals will then borrow to 
provide for consumption. In the next period they will 
receive a bequest from the old and use the bequest plus 
the endowment to repay the previous loan and make 
additional loans to the new generation of young. In their 
last period, the receipts from loans made previously will 
be used partly for consumption with the rest being 
passed on as bequests to the middle aged. The role of 
credit markets can be seen to be crucial because 
without them the old cannot acquire assets (by lending 
in the previous period) in order to finance consumption 
and bequests. If credit markets are perfect and bequests 
are operative, then a social security program that taxes 
the middle aged with the proceeds going to the old may 
be neutralized by bequests in the reverse direction. On 
the other hand, if there are no credit markets, then such 
a policy cannot be neutralized because the bequest 
motive will not be operative initially. 
Another qualification concerns the nature of taxes 
imposed. The previous analysis assumed that all taxes 
were lump sum, that is, unrelated to the economic 
decisions being made by agents. On the other hand, if 
the government were to levy taxes on consumption or 
on income (defined to include interest income), then the 
consumption/saving decisions of agents (as well as 
their labor/leisure decisions, if the labor supply were 
elastic) may get distorted in spite of there being 
operative bequests or gifts. This conclusion, however, 
depends on the assumption that bequests (or gifts) 
continue to be made in a lump-sum fashion. There is no 
reason why this should be so when taxes are distortion-
ary. Bequests and gifts may themselves be conditioned 
on behavior in a way that neutralizes "distortionary" 
taxes (Bagwell and Bernheim 1986). 
It was mentioned previously that intergenerational 
linkages may exhibit either paternalistic or nonpa-
ternalistic caring. The neutrality results depend cru-
cially on the linkage being nonpaternalistic. If, for 
instance, people derive pleasure from the act of giv-
ing per se, which is unrelated to the effects of the 
bequest or the gift on the receiver, then changes in 
government policies will not be neutralized by compen-
sating changes in private bequests or gifts. 
A final qualification that we have omitted through-
out our discussion is that of uncertain lifetimes and 
imperfect annuities markets (Eckstein, Eichenbaum, 
and Peled 1982). These can result in involuntary 
bequests and a beneficial role for compulsory social 
security programs. The latter can arise because in 
the absence of government intervention, individuals 
dealing in imperfect or nonexistent annuities markets 
may be unable to properly share the risks of inoppor-
tune death. 
An extension of the setup in this paper would be to 
modify the implicit assumption that the family tree 
originating from one initial old does not overlap with 
that of any other initial old. This is clearly unrealistic 
considering the predominance of reproduction by mar-
riage among previously unrelated persons. The nature 
of linkages within the same generation and across 
members of different generations can get quite complex 
under this system with overlapping family trees. This 
leads to a situation in which different members of the 
older generation may care about the same members of 
the younger generation or indirectly about the same 
members of the next-to-next generation and so on.
1
0 
10Suppose we interpret each person to be a couple. Then a male child of one 
couple and a female child of another couple form a person in the next 
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This results in horizontal linkages among members of 
the same generation and in bequest externalities in 
which one set of parents may reduce their bequest given 
that the child is also receiving a bequest from another 
set of parents. 
Under this extended setup, the proliferation of 
linkages widens the scope for neutrality of government 
policies. As an example, government transfers from one 
set of parents-in-law to the other set can be neutralized 
by the first reducing their bequest to their son (or 
daughter) and the second increasing their bequest to 
their daughter (or son). Thus, not only intergenerational 
transfers but within-generation transfers may also turn 
out to be neutral. This, together with the neutrality of 
"distortionary" taxes discussed previously, suggests 
that the scope of neutrality results is uncomfortably 




 While a significant number of 
economists may be willing to accept the latter, very few 
would go along with the much wider neutrality results. 
This suggests that some important considerations are 
being overlooked in the present framework of intergen-
erational linkages. Alternatively, one could argue that 
the framework of linkages is not a good approximation 
to reality and that the Ricardian doctrine is (approxi-
mately) valid for reasons entirely different from the 
effects of intergenerational linkages. 
Conclusion 
It seems clear that the presence of intergenerational 
linkages limits the potency of government budget 
policies. Whether or not this limitation is strong enough 
so that policies of realistic magnitudes are best approxi-
mated as being neutral can only be judged by detailed 
empirical investigation. If government policies are 
judged to be approximately neutral, then we need not 
worry about the effects on private saving, investment, 
or the intergenerational distribution of wealth. If they 
are not, then there are legitimate grounds for being 
concerned about the burden of taxation that is being 
passed on to future generations and the crowding out 
effects of government debt on capital accumulation. 
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generation. Clearly, this person may receive bequests from both sets of parents. 
Two persons in the older generation may also be linked by marriage in the 
next-to-next generation, and so on. 
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 As discussed before, this need not imply that the resulting allocations are 
efficient. 
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